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Our objective is to illustrate the uses of the software
GORILLE that we developped at the High Security Lab1
and more recently at CYBER-DETECT. The recent attacks
of LockerGoga against Altran in France and Norsk Hydro
in Norway illustrate the necessity to have advanced anti-
malware defences. GORILLE’s basis are morphological
analysis. As such, the main features of GORILLE are the
following. It is robust with respect to heavy code obfusca-
tions. It applies on dynamic data that can be forged within
a virtual environment. Its detection engine is based on be-
haviour recognition. This contribution is an extended ver-
sion of our Blog’s post2.
Before we talk about reverse engineering, let us present
the subject of our interest. LockerGoga is a malware that
targeted two major companies at the begining of 2019. The
first one is Altran in France [?] while the second one is
Norsk Hydro [?]. The ”success” of these two attacks show
the need of new detection techniques. GORILLE is such
a tool. It is now developed by CYBER-DETECT following
research in morphological analysis at LORIA [?, ?]. The
attack in France happened in January and the one in Nor-
way in March. Actually, those two attacks should have been
stopped. Indeed, the GORILLE engine does the job. It de-
tects LockerGoga and its variants as we will show it.
In a nutshell, GORILLE identifies malicious threats em-
bedded in Linux, MacOS and Windows binary files. For this
sake, GORILLE keeps a collection of malicious behaviours.
Each binary file submitted to GORILLE is then scanned and
as soon as a set of malicious inter-link behaviours is de-
tected, GORILLE raises an alert. There is no magic behind,
just several years of hard work at Loria’s Computer Science
Lab. For a full presentation of morphological analysis, we
refer the reader to our previous contributions, see for in-
1https://lhs.loria.fr/
2See http://www.cyber-detect.com/fr-blog.html.
stance [?, ?, ?]. But presently, there is no need to open the
engine, looking at morphological analysis as a black box is
sufficient.
In this contribution, we do not solve any specific sci-
entific issue. We want to show that our earlier research
works—which were attacking some hard scientific points—
can/should be reconsidered as a whole. All the ingredi-
ents participate to the recipe, dynamic analysis, anti-anti-
debugging/virtualization and finally morphological analy-
sis. All these little steps contributed to the tool GORILLE
that may serve at many levels within defenses: from detec-
tion to retro-engineering. We see this outcome as a strong
stimulation to solve some apparently very focused issues.
Put all together, they serve greater purposes.
1 A first step: the detection
Since GORILLE search process is based on a collection
of malicious behaviours, the first question which comes in
mind is whether or not GORILLE is able to detect Locker-
Goga. The database used for the experiments (”malware-
static 24” in the figure below) contains N = 32, 812, 355
malicious behaviours. Among all of them, GORILLE iden-
tifies 60 malicious behaviours in the submitted sample of
LockerGoga.
Signature based detection techniques need regular up-
dates of their database. Our slogan is that morphological
analysis is quite robust to malware versioning or malware
repackaging. For that sake, we actually—but, let’s confess
it, we did it also for fun—used for the experiments our old
malware database dating from 2013. And six years later, it
is still up to date!
At first side, it could seem that 60 is not that much com-
pared to the m = 3573 behaviours of Hmir.tpz and the
n = 9879 behaviours of LockerGoga. But, nevertheless,
it is significant. We address the question in two parts.
First, finding one behaviour is already meaningful. With
the parameters in use, the order of magnitude of the set of
Figure 1. LockerGoga’s proximity to Hmir.tpz
all behaviours (they are stored as labeled graphs of size 24)
is
|U | ∼ 224 × 2448 ∼ 2244.
Thus, given N ∼ 225, the probability of a false pos-
itive evaluates to m × N/|U | ∼ 2−244+24+13 = 2−207.
In other words, there is (almost) no chances we pick up a
malware behaviour randomly. Nevertheless, one should be
careful: the probability of a behaviour does not follow a
uniform random law. For instance, there are quite frequent
behaviours that are coming from third party libraries written
by companies such as Microsoft or open source libraries.
Collectively, third party libraries also denote behaviours.
They occur in malware but they are not specific to malware.
Thus, our tool stores them in a ”white list” database (see
”WL 24-20180108” in the figure below), such behaviours
are then removed from maware databases. The observed
false positive ratio is compatible with the theoretical one.
Conclusion, we can state that the observed sample is defi-
nitely a malware. The second question is: can it be related
to some particular one?
One may naively think that the number of common be-
haviours is the right measure. It is not. The issue can be
explained as follows. In the following graph, we suppose
we have a ”green” malware M and a ”red” sample S, the





Even if the intersection on the left is smaller, we can say
that in this case, the sample S ”extends” M which is not
the case for the right drawing. So, it is important to take
into account the size of the matched malware. Our proxim-
ity measure is based on a probabilistic argument which we
briefly justify.
Let us suppose we have a malware, its behaviours should
be in our database. Let us choose randomly n such be-
haviours among N . How many of these are common to the
m behaviours of Hmir.tpz? Actually, the value follows
an hypergeometric law3. Thus, according to it, the expected





Now, 60 takes a different flavor. But we can go further, the
standard deviation is given by the formula
σ =
√
n×m× (N −m)× (N − n)
N2 × (N − 1)
which in the present case amounts approximatively to 1.03.
As a conclusion, 60 is far beyond the expected value.
Actually, in our experiment, we could see that there
is an other related guy to LockerGoga. It is called
Sheldor.db. It has 47 common behaviours with
LockerGoga but all these 47 behaviours are common to
Hmir.tpz. Thus, there are no needs to make enquiries in
that way.
To conclude, as we see, GORILLE detects 60 malicious
behaviours in the yet undetected sample of LockerGoga.
The technological advance of GORILLE allows to stop vari-
ants of (some) unknown threats.
The alert being launched, it is time to start to do some
retro-engineering.
2 LockerGoga wears different dresses
The sample named LockerGoga Altran [?] cor-
responds to the malware that attacked Altran in Jan-
3As a matter of fact, with m  N , we could use in practice a simple
binomial law. But, rigorously, it is hypergeometric.
uary 25th, 2019. On March 8th, 2019 that is two
months later, MalwareHunterTeam discovered in [?]
that a variant of LockerGoga, that we name here
no-detected LockerGoga was left undetected by all
anti-virus products in Virus Total [?]. No shame with that,
don’t forget that malware detection is an heavily compli-
cated problem, actually shown to be undecidable by Co-
hen [?] or by Adleman [?].
Actually, we can play with GORILLE a little bit more. In-
deed, GORILLE is able to learn the specific malicious func-
tionalities of LockerGoga by itself. First, we built the
”LockerGoga” specific database which contains the 9879
behaviours (also mentioned as sites) in LockerGoga, not
only bad ones. Indeed, LockerGoga incorporates, as usual
in any software, see figure ??.
That said, we can compare all behaviours of Locker-
Goga Altran, which were involved in Altran incident and
the no-detected LockerGoga of MalwareHunter. There are
4270 common behaviours, roughly the half, that are com-
mon between bot samples. See figure ??.
Then, using our tool binsim from the GORILLE suite,
we can synchronize both codes, that is to find the precise
correspondence between functions of LockerGoga Altran
and no-detected LockerGoga. Actually, in that case, the
correspondence was ”too” easy. Once we know the cor-
respondence, using our synchronization script, we can even
see it within the IDA software4.
4https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/
Some other tools may be used for code synchronisa-
tion. For instance, let us mention bindiff [?]. Compared
to binsim, as their name suggest, bindiff will search
for differences where binsim will perform—possibly
wrong—connections. For malware, the ”signal” being
rather ”noisy”, we think our approach looks to be more pro-
ductive.
And then came the Norsk Hydro’s attack. We wanted to
recognize the malware. Again, we find a clue in our main
database. After comparison with the LockerGoga database,
no doubt that both are very close.
3 Some LockerGoga’s technicalities
Let us add few words on the retro-engineering of Lock-
erGoga. We learnt from [?] that LockerGoga is using
CryptoPP. Let’s go. First, we learn CryptoPP and then, we
use the function matching engine of GORILLE to simplify
the IDA view. Functions within LockerGoga are automati-
cally labeled with CryptoPP library’s names.
The other library that is used by LockerGoga is
boost. But which version of boost? To determine it,
we learned LockerGoga’s behaviours and we searched
for matching with different versions of boost compiled
with different versions of Microsoft Visual C++. The out-
put of GORILLE is:
BOOST 1.68 / msvc12
"boost_filesystem-vc120-mt-x32-1_68.dll": 19 matching sites / 1290 sites
4127 nodes = 425 small nodes + 1390 white nodes + 29 matched nodes + 2283 specific nodes
0.00\% 19 / 1290 ou 11148, 1.47\% 0.17\% : LockerGoga_Norsk-Hydro.exe
----------------------------
BOOST 1.69 / msvc14.0
"boost_filesystem-vc140-mt-x32-1_69.dll": 19 matching sites / 1406 sites
4821 nodes = 667 small nodes + 1337 white nodes + 29 matched nodes + 2788 specific nodes
0.00\% 19 / 1406 ou 11148, 1.35\% 0.17\% : LockerGoga_Norsk-Hydro.exe
---------------------------
BOOST 1.69 / msvc14.1
"boost_filesystem-vc141-mt-x32-1_69.dll": 180 matching sites / 1620 sites
3801 nodes = 364 small nodes + 111 white nodes + 647 matched nodes + 2679 specific nodes
Figure 2. Learning LockerGoga
Figure 3. Altran’s LockerGoga versus MalwareHunters LockerGoga
Figure 4. LockerGoga reversed within IDA
0.18\% 180 / 1620 ou 11148, 11.11\% 1.61\% : LockerGoga_Norsk-Hydro.exe
---------------------------
...
The best match we find corresponds to boost.1 69
compiled with Visual C++ 14.1. This gives us a good in-
dication that the malware was built quite recently. With
respect to the compiler, the malware is posterior to March
2017 according to Microsoft documentation. With respect
to boost version, it is posterior to December 12th, 2018. So,
yes, LockerGoga was really fresh meat.
Now that we have identified the closest version of boost,
we can recompile it to get the corresponding symbols in a
pdb file (that is in Program Database format). This will
help IDA for the disassembling process, but more impor-
tantly it will provide the exact name (together with their
profile) of identified functions. We developed an IDA script
in PYTHON that 1) reads the pdb file, 2) build a synchroni-
sation file mapping addresses within LockerGoga to ad-
dresses within boost. This leads to the following tab in
IDA:
Then, within IDA, identified functions are presented
with their profile. For instance, an excerpt of LockerGoga
within IDA:
Among the 7656 functions found by IDA within
LockerGoga (see picture below) we identified without
difficulties 178 functions of boost. Finally, if we add
functions from CryptoPP and standard libraries, we iden-
tified correctly 2500 functions. All in all, that corresponds
to one third of the whole program. Due to the precision (no
false positive) of the method, this work is less tedious com-
pared to techniques based on FLIRT signatures (for which
a manual inspection is often needed).
Up to this point, everything was done statically. But,
GORILLE can take benefit of our dynamic analysis frame-
work. It is based on DYNAMORIO with special efforts to
make it transparent to anti-virtualization techniques. And
LockerGoga use some of them. There are suspicious
cpuid instructions. But, our tool also observed a ”Sys-
temKernelDebuggerInformation” that is clearly a protec-
tion.
There is also call to ”OutputDebugString”, but that one
serves for other purposes. Notice that these calls are made
in a separate process that is launched by the original one.
And yes, we follow sub-processes and threads. Here is a
view
Second point, our tool did not see any self-modification
tricks. Thus the static analysis of the file is sufficient.
Again, that information saves so much time for the retro-
engineer. Nevertheless, the execution of the malware is ob-
fuscated. The main process launch some sub-processes that
serve to hide/encrypt data. For instance we can read within
the execution trace the following call:













So, LockerGoga first creates a process that launch a
command stored at address 0x004d7f18 which contains
the string
"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe \
/c move /y e:\Exec\LockerGoga_Norsk-Hydro.exe \
C:\Windows\TEMP\tgytutrc720.exe"
that is, it launch a copy of itself. We can observe it a little
bit afterwards:
[0x004d7f18] "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe \









where option m stands for master process. The flag
serves to manage encryption.
And just for fun. Was the malware difficult to code? It
could be. There is a mysterious call to the debugger.
0x0118d5fb call [0x7694b2b7] WINAPI \
OutputDebugStringA(




All right, GORILLE sees LockerGoga. Does it mean it
will discover every malware? No, of course not. But, it
clearly sees (some) malware that others don’t see. We think
that a panel of detecting engine using different technologies
is much stronger than a simple anti-virus software and want
to contribute to this aim.
